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Abstract: The paper offers a first-hand insight into the situation in Kosovo shortly after 
its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 and takes a look at the un-
expectedly poor results of the UN interim administration of Kosovo. Arguing against 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence, it draws attention to the fact that in 2007 a 
number of UN observers took the unprecedented step of compiling an independent 
analysis, which they published and circulated without filtering it through the chain of 
command, and that in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo’s declared independence, a 
large number of UN field officers voiced their concerns about the international com-
munity turning a blind eye to the reality of the situation on the ground.  
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In Mitrovica, Kosovo all seems quiet at the north end of the bridge. A pair 
of NATO patrol vehicles, a handful of French soldiers, a couple of UN po-
licemen and several rolls of barbed wire block access to the roadway.
I take some photographs and start walking back into the Serbian sec-
tor of the city. It is only then that I spot a group of young Serbs lingering in 
the shade of a kiosk. These young men are known as the “bridgewatchers”, 
and since the Kosovo conflict began in June 1999, they have maintained 
a 24-hour vigil on the Serbian side of this contested span across the Ibar 
River.
In the summer of 1999, as NATO forces deployed into Kosovo and 
Serbian security forces withdrew, nearly 800,000 Albanian Kosovars came 
flooding back into the province after they were displaced during the 78-day 
NATO bombing campaign. This in turn generated an exodus from Kosovo 
of approximately 200,000 Serb and non-Albanian minorities who fled in 
fear of Albanian reprisals.
It was here in Kosovska Mitrovica that the flood of Serb refugees 
halted at the Ibar River and defiantly laid claim to the northern portion 
of Kosovo, which is an entirely ethnic Serbian enclave connected to the 
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Republic of Serbia. Numerous violent encounters have taken place across 
the Mitrovica bridge between Albanians, Serbs and NATO troops. Located 
next to the Republic of Serbia, this entirely ethnic Serbian enclave has come 
to symbolize the failure of the international community to overcome the 
divide of ethnic hatred in Kosovo.
Following the Albanians’ unilateral declaration of independence on 
17 February, the Serbs of the Mitrovica pocket and other protected en-
claves have refused to accept the authority of the newly proclaimed state of 
“Kosova”.
To demonstrate their resolve, the Serbs took control of the Mitro-
vica courthouse and installed their own officials. It was this occupation of 
regional offices by the Serbs that led to a bloody confrontation with NATO 
troops on 17 March.
When UN police and NATO vehicles rolled in to arrest the violators, 
the bridgewatchers sounded an air raid siren to summon other Serbs to the 
scene. The angry crowds clashed with the international security forces and 
vehicles were set ablaze, shots were fired. One Ukrainian soldier died, 63 
NATO soldiers were injured, and an undetermined number of Serbs were 
seriously wounded.
In a scathing internal memo to his superiors, UN regional repre-
sentative Jerry Gallucci described the debacle as an “ill-conceived opera-
tion (that) has led to the disappearance of law and order in the north (of 
Kosovo)”.
Gallucci was particularly incensed that the international community 
chose 17 March to launch their operation, as this date coincided with the 
anniversary of the 2004 pogrom in which three dozen people were killed 
and Albanians torched more than 800 Serbian homes. In Gallucci’s opin-
ion, this timing coupled with the heavy-handed tactic of arresting and 
transporting the courthouse squatters “seemed almost designed to inflame 
Serbian sentiments”.
When travelling through Kosovo it would be easy for someone to 
mistakenly believe this region has just become the 51st U.S. state — rather 
than a self-proclaimed independent country. On most homes the American 
stars and stripes are fluttering alongside the Albanian flag — even on many 
public institutions.
Prior to their February 17th unilateral declaration of independence, 
the U.S. had sponsored a competition that resulted in the selection of a new 
yellow on blue special Kosovo flag. Thousands of these flags were produced 
and distributed for free in the hope that they would be a proud visual sym-
bol of the new and distinct state of Kosovo. Unfortunately for the planners 
in the U.S. State Department, the Albanians living in Kosovo do not regard 
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continue to display the black double headed eagle on a red background 
— the official flag of the neighbouring Republic of Albania. They are unre-
pentant, proud Albanians, and they fly the American flag in recognition of 
the fact that only through a decade of U.S. military aid and political pressure 
have they wrested control of a province that is Serbian sovereign territory 
and proclaimed it as their own.
In addition to the flags, the Albanians pay fawning tribute to former 
U.S. President Bill Clinton in the form of 70-foot high posters of him hang-
ing in Pristina, the Kosovo capital. It was Clinton who pressured NATO 
into supporting the separatist Albanian guerrilla force known as the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) in their struggle against Serbian security forces in 
1999. Ironically, it was only the year before that the U.S. State Department 
listed the KLA as a terrorist organization due to their tactics of targeting 
innocent Serb civilians in order to provoke retaliatory measures from Ser-
bian troops.
However, once NATO air power entered the equation, the tables 
were turned firmly in favour of the Albanians, and they now have no qualms 
about publicly showing their appreciation. At the southern end of Pristina, 
a scale model statue of liberty sits atop the Victory Hotel and even Hillary 
Clinton has a street in the Kosovo capital named in her honour. Strangely 
enough, the U.S. scheme to create an independent Kosovo has not garnered 
much support from Muslim countries. With the notable exception of Tur-
key and Afghanistan, the majority of Islamic republics have refused to rec-
ognize Kosovo for the reason that they see it as an American puppet state.
Although the 1998 U.S. assessment of the KLA as terrorists was an 
accurate one — that is not how they are being depicted in Kosovo these 
days. In the course of the 18 month long insurgency and NATO offensive, 
the KLA did not win a single stand up engagement over the Serbs. Their 
dubious martial accomplishments include the widespread murder of Ser-
bian civilians and Albanian collaborators after NATO entered the province 
and became responsible for security.
Nevertheless,  there  are  innumerable  monuments  erected  all  over 
Kosovo to revere these “heroes” and “martyrs”. Given that this conflict in 
Kosovo was a bloody inter-ethnic civil war, and the fact that the original 
NATO mandate was to provide a safe environment for all Kovoso minori-
ties, many international observers recognize that these monuments to KLA 
fighters only serve to intimidate non-Albanians.
In the entirely ethnic Serbian enclave of Štrpce in southern Kosovo, 
the Albanians built a massive monument in honour of their KLA fighters 
who died trying to capture this same village. Realizing that the Serbs in this 
enclave may not be too enamoured with a statue of their erstwhile enemies 
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prevent any vandalism. Thus far the newly constructed KLA monument 
remains unscathed. In comparison, over the past nine years the Albanians 
have managed to destroy more than 150 Serbian Orthodox churches and 
monasteries — despite the fact that NATO’s mandate includes protection 
of religious sites.
Kosovo was admittedly dependant on the U.S. for its creation, re-
mains independent upon NATO troops for security and protection, requires 
massive amounts of foreign aid to survive and the Albanian majority openly 
rejoice in the fact they now live in greater Albania.
In the leadup to, and in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo’s de-
clared independence, a large number of UN field officers voiced their con-
cerns about the international community turning a blind eye to the reality 
of the situation on the ground.
Last year, a number of UN observers took the unprecedented step 
of compiling an independent analysis, which they published and circulated 
without filtering it through the chain of command.
The stated intention of the anonymous authors was to illustrate “the 
divide that exists between (their) first-hand knowledge ... and the rosy pic-
ture of the overall situation that is officially presented by top UN officials”.
The facts presented in the report show that over the past nine years, 
the UN has failed to achieve its stated objectives in virtually every cat-
egory.
To illustrate the international community’s failure to provide a secure 
environment for non-Albanians in Kosovo, they point to the fact that there 
have been more than 1,000 abductions of Serbs and other minorities since 
1999. Of that number, only 253 bodies have been discovered, and yet not a 
single person has been found guilty for these crimes.
The report also contained a catalogue of allegations including:
• This safe and secure environment for a sustainable return has never 
been implemented.
• More than 220,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians remain in dis-
placement.
• UNHCR reports 16,000 returns since 1999, of which only 5–6,000 
are Serbs; but this does not take into account the continued emigration.
• Many of the remaining Serbs, Gorani, Turks, Roma, based on our 
field knowledge, are pondering departure under present conditions, and will 
certainly leave should Kosovo gain independence.
• A majority Albanian community that, since the 1990s, lives in a 
culture that promotes intolerance with little or no moral obligation toward 
non-Albanians.
• A discriminatory privatization scheme that has deprived countless 
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• Serbian farmers and monks all over Kosovo have no or limited ac-
cess to their agricultural land for the last eight years.
• Escorts must still be provided for Serbs living in western and south-
ern Kosovo.
• The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government have provided no 
cooperation in investigation alleged war crimes against non-Albanians or 
assisting in locating missing non-Albanians.
• UNMIK has consistently failed in providing adequate witness pro-
tection to potential witnesses resulting in a number of verified killings of 
witnesses.
• The recent statement of two UNMIK international prosecutors 
who claimed to have been pressured by top UNMIK officials with regards 
to the Ramush Haradinaj case attests to this obstruction.
• The same obstruction could be garnered from testimony by former 
International Prosecutor in Kosovo (now Judge) Mrs. Renate Winter.
• Two SRSG’s openly provided public support to an indicted war 
criminal, the aforementioned Mrs. Haradinaj.
• This support was extended to other ex-members of the KLA, who 
were alleged to have committed war crimes. Several senior CIVPOL of-
ficers have also testified as to the obstruction they faced from top UNMIK 
officials when attempting to conduct police investigations into senior ex-
KLA members.
In addition to these serious allegations of favouritism and collusion 
with the senior Albanian leadership, the report notes that under the terms 
of UN Resolution 1244, which facilitated the entry of NATO into Kosovo, 
the international community was to take full responsibility for the protec-
tion of Serbian heritage religious sites. Despite the presence of more than 
20,000 security personnel over the past nine years, Albanian extremists have 
managed to destroy more than 150 Serbian churches and monasteries — 
many dating back to the 11th century.
One of the most alarming assessments in the UN field officers’ report 
is that the criminal leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guer-
rilla force, which was supposed to be disbanded, has instead assumed posi-
tions of power at all levels of Kosovo society. According to their summary, 
the KLA has simply “transformed into criminal structures, carrying out or-
ganized crime activities of drugs and weapons trafficking and prostitution”.
As one field officer stated, those guerrillas “are the real power in 
Kosovo and many of their leaders are now politicians at all levels — includ-
ing Prime Minister (Hashim Thaci)”.
The Kosovo police service is described as “poorly competent” and 
that, in turn, has resulted in a “culture that promotes intolerance with little 
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The assessment of life in Kosovo for ethnic minorities is one of lim-
ited freedom of movement and constant fear. Also cited in the report is the 
fact that the international community has failed to protect non-Albanian 
language rights and that they have allowed the flag of the Republic of Al-
bania to fly on most public institutions since 1999.
In their report’s conclusion, the UN officers point out that the Pris-
tina sports stadium is emblazoned with “an enormous picture of an armed, 
bearded, combat-uniformed KLA leader”.
Such an image, they argue, runs counter to the UN’s original mission 
of making Kosovo a secure environment for all residents. Failure to remove 
the provocative poster demonstrates that the international community is in 
fact “bowing to the dictates of extremists and warlords”.
Although this blunt assessment of the Kosovo situation was pre-
sented as a briefing note to the fact-finding delegation of the UN Security 
Council, the recommendation that the granting of independence would be 
an “irresponsible act” has now been superseded by the Albanians’ February 
17 unilateral declaration.
Senior officials working with the UN in Kosovo confirmed that the 
analysis of this report was accurate, and they are frustrated and disappointed 
with the sudden elimination of their mandate.
“The original role for the (NATO-led Kosovo troops, or KFOR) was 
to enforce UN Resolution 1244 — which clearly recognized the Serbian 
sovereignty over Kosovo,” explained Edward Tawii, a Canadian adviser to 
the UN interim administration police, who has spent the past eight years 
based there. “Now they say that KFOR will be responsible to provide a se-
cure environment in support of the independence declaration.”
While the UN mission continues to function in this interim period, 
the administrative oversight in Kosovo is slowly being assumed by the Eu-
ropean Union. The EU will monitor and assist the newly proclaimed in-
dependent Kosovar government and oversee the operation of the Kosovo 
police service. KFOR troops will remain in place for the foreseeable future, 
and NATO will continue to train and equip the Kosovo defence forces.
Since Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence, the gov-
ernment continues to administer services such as the issuing of pension 
cheques to those residing in non-Albanian enclaves. Despite the presence 
of so many foreign troops and police officers — 20,000 in a region of only 
two million inhabitants — this overlapping of responsibility has generated 
a lot of confusion.
In many cases, the various and diverse national interests of the con-
tributing NATO and non-NATO security forces have been exploited by 
the criminal elements of the Albanian population. In the village of Orcusa, 
in the southern Kosovo mountainous region known as Gora, Norbert, a S. Taylor, Bridging the Great Divide 283
German master warrant officer, pointed out that the border to Albania here 
is wide open.
“Between us and the Albanian towns across the valley there is not 
even a checkpoint, let alone any barriers.” According to the German officer, 
NATO soldiers in this sector refer to the Kosovo border police as the traffic 
police, since their purpose seems to be in assisting the flow of contraband, 
rather than impeding it.
In addition to the drugs and weapons smuggled across this border, 
there are vast tracts of deforested hillside where the Albanians crossed into 
Kosovo to cut down trees. According to the German, this uncontested ex-
ploitation of Kosovo’s resources and the open conduit for illegal trade could 
easily be curtailed.
“We have reconnaissance vehicles with incredible surveillance capa-
bility,” he said. “Our cameras would be able to pick up the colour of the 
woodcutter’s eyes — right across the valley. And one platoon of troops 
would suffice to close the border.”
Asked why, over the past nine years, this has never been done, Nor-
bert shrugged and said, “because somebody higher than my rank level wants 
it to remain open.”
While international observers on the ground may be highly critical of 
the way events are unfolding in Kosovo and remain hard-pressed to explain 
the often contradictory policies and mandates they are asked to enforce, the 
one thing that is quite clear is that another confrontation is imminent and 
unavoidable.
A second showdown with the Serbs in Mitrovica is likely to erupt 
when NATO attempts to make good on their public promise to arrest the 
Serbian ringleaders of the March 17 incident. Such a policy would ignore 
the recommendations of UN regional representative Jerry Gallucci. In his 
report, Gallucci urged his colleagues to offer the Serbs some “contrition or 
recognition of the mistake (the international community) made.”
Instead, it seems that NATO wants to force submission on the Mi-
trovica Serbs as quickly as possible. One reason for this is that the Serbian 
parliament has been in limbo during the runup to the May 11 elections, and 
the fractious parties have yet to form a working government. The primary 
battle cry throughout the election campaign for both the Serbian Demo-
cratic Party and the nationalist Radical Party has been “Kosovo is Serbia”.
A solution imposed on Mitrovica while the Serbian leadership is in 
limbo would encounter far less opposition than after the next government 
is formed.
The clock is also ticking towards the next general assembly meet-
ing at the UN in September. So far, 34 countries, including Canada, have 
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a consensus at the UN assembly that will declare Kosovo’s unilateral inde-
pendence illegal.
“We will be seeking a solution which will accommodate everyone and 
still uphold the UN Charter,” said Serbian ambassador to Canada Dušan 
Bataković from Belgrade.
Following Canada’s recognition of Kosovo, Bataković was recalled to 
the Serbian capital.
“While we are firm on Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, we are will-
ing to discuss a power-sharing arrangement,” he said, “and we want a re-
newal of multilateral discussions under UN auspices.”
As for Canada’s position on Kosovo, Bataković was disappointed 
there was no parliamentary debate before Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
announced the decision.
“What exactly is independent about Kosovo? The UN resolution 
covering its status remains valid, there are thousands of international troops 
deployed  to  provide  security,  and  significant  numbers  of  non-Albanian 
Kosovo minorities are defying this decision.”
As the international community engages in a war of words and dip-
lomatic manoeuvring, the bridgewatchers in Mitrovica continue to monitor 
NATO activity on the far riverbank.
According  to  a  senior  NATO  intelligence  officer,  the  next  con-
frontation is expected to occur within a matter of “days or weeks — not 
months”.
Following the May 11 Serbian elections and the recent top-level 
meetings between Russia, China and India in Moscow, it would seem that 
the Kosovo situation will remain a lit powderkeg for the foreseeable future.
One can only hope that at the UN general assembly meeting in Sep-
tember, Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is declared illegal. 
Canada and other countries that were pressured by the U.S. State Depart-
ment can then use the opportunity to reverse their decision and uphold the 
UN charter.
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